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URING the Survey period, the Texas appellate courts handed
down numerous decisions construing various rules of civil evi-
dence. The cases of greatest significance arose in the following
substantive areas: (1) Article I - General Provisions; (2) Article II -
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Judicial Notice; (3) Burden of Proof, Presumptions, and Inferences; (4)
Article IV - Relevancy and Its Limits; (5) Article V - Privileges; (6)
Article VI - Witnesses; (7) Article VII - Opinions and Expert Testi-
mony; (8) Article VIII - Hearsay; (9) Article IX - Authentication and
Identification; (10) Article X - Contents of Writings, Recordings, and
Photographs; and (11) Parol Evidence.
I. ARTICLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence apply in all civil proceedings except
as otherwise provided by statute.' Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 102 pro-
vides that civil evidence rules shall be construed to secure fairness in ad-
ministration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence so that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 2 One appel-
late court during the Survey period considered the trial court's conduct of
a trial in this context of Rule 102, as well as Rule 611, which provides that
the court shall exercise reasonable control over presentation of evidence
so as to make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascer-
tainment of the truth.3
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(1) provides that error may not be
predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless a sub-
stantial right of a party is affected and, in the case of a ruling admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appeared of record, stat-
ing the specific ground of objection if the specific ground is not apparent
from the context.4 In order for an objection to be timely, it must be made
before the witness responds to the question if it is reasonably obvious
that the question calls for inadmissible evidence.5 However, where an
answer is nonresponsive, an adverse party's objection to nonresponsive-
ness of testimony is not untimely if made after the question has been
asked and answered. 6
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(2) provides that in the case of a
ruling excluding evidence, error is not preserved unless the substance of
the evidence was made known to the court by offer.7 An appellant's fail-
ure to make an offer of proof following the trial court's sustaining of a
1. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 101(b); In re G.F.O., 874 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (applying the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence to discretionary
transfer of juvenile to criminal district court under TEX. FAM. CODE § 56.01).
2. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 102.
3. Sims v. Brackett, 885 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ)
(citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 102 & 611).
4. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 103(a)(1).
5. Beall v. Ditmore, 867 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1993, writ denied).
6. Id. (motorist's attorney was not required to object until after accident victim gave
unresponsive testimony on insurance policy limits in response to motorist's attorney's
question on how victim had determined level of damages to seek a lawsuit).
7. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 103(a)(2).
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hearsay objection to certain testimony precluded appellate review of ap-
pellant's claim that exclusion was error.8
To preserve a complaint that the trial court improperly excluded evi-
dence, the complaining party must make an offer of proof as to what the
excluded witness would have testified.9 A bench conference outside the
hearing of the jury that apprised the court of the nature of certain testi-
mony was an informal offer of proof and was sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements of Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(b) and Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure 52(a) and (b), where the judge who excluded the
evidence as cumulative could not properly have so ruled unless he knew
the essential substance of the excluded testimony.
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 105(a) provides that evidence that is ad-
missible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to an-
other party or for another purpose shall be restricted as to its proper
scope by the court upon request of a party. 10 Evidence admitted for a
limited purpose can be considered for only that purpose and may not be
weighed in determining sufficiency of evidence for a matter outside of the
specific limitation of the evidence.1'
II. ARTICLE II - JUDICIAL NOTICE
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 201, which governs judicial notice of adju-
dicative facts, 12 permits a court to take judicial notice of a wide variety of
facts. Judicial notice is usually limited to matters that are generally
known or easily proven and that cannot be reasonably disputed.' 3 A
court may take judicial notice that a pleading has been filed in a case, but
may not take judicial notice of the truth of the allegations in the
pleadings.14
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 201(c) provides that a court may take
judicial notice whether requested or not.' 5 One court during the Survey
period took judicial notice on its own motion of federal court orders in
related proceedings. 16
8. Mosley v. Employers Casualty Co., 873 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994,
writ granted).
9. Sims, 885 S.W.2d at 454 (citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 102 & 611).
10. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 105(a).
11. Texas Commerce Bank Reagan v. Lebco Constructors, 865 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (evidence on fraud and negligent misrepresenta-
tion charges brought by general contractor against bank for failure to fund loan to owner
was insufficient to support any award for direct losses in excess of $1.73 million).
12. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 201.
13. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 201(b).
14. Tschirhart v. Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d 507, 508-09 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.)
(court could not take judicial notice of truth of statements in sworn inventory and ap-
praisement filed in divorce proceeding, but not admitted into evidence at trial).
15. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 201(c).




Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. 17 During
the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the propriety of an
appellate court is taking judicial notice for the first time on appeal in
Office of Public Utility Council v. Public Utility Commission of Texas.18
As the propriety of judicial notice is reviewed by standard appellate prin-
ciples, a trial court committed harmless error at most by taking judicial
notice of the net worth of a defendant found to have fraudulently induced
a contract. 19
A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter no-
ticed.20 Nothing was preserved for appellate review where a party did
not object to a trial court's fact gathering, did not request a hearing, and
did not show that he was harmed in any way by the trial courts impliedly
taking judicial notice of a child's being born in full-term in a paternity
action.21
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 202 governs termination of the laws of
other states.22 Under Rule 202, a party is entitled upon timely request to
an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice
and the tenor of the matter noticed.23 Absent a request to take judicial
notice of the laws of another state, or absent proper proof of the laws of
another state, Texas courts presume the laws to be the same as Texas
law.2
4
In Keene Corp. v. Rogers,25 Alabama law was properly applied to a
proximate cause issue in a Texas asbestos exposure case arising from al-
leged exposure to asbestos products in Alabama. The plaintiffs did not
prove, and the trial court did not judicially notice, any Alabama law on
the issue. The trial court, however, announced it was applying Alabama
law and specifically stated it was using Alabama submissions in the jury
charge. The defendant-manufacturer failed to object to application of Al-
abama law at any time in the proceeding.
17. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 201(f).
18. 878 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1994) (court of appeals erred by refusing to take judicial
notice of the published order of Public Utility Commission); see also Wright v. Wright, 867
S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied) (in a proceeding to modify child
support, appellate court took judicial notice for the first time on appeal that the distance
between appellant's place of residence in San Antonio and children's place of residence in
Odessa is 335 miles).
19. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Arthur Bros., Inc., 882 S.W.2d 917, 930 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1994, writ requested).
20. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 201(e).
21. In re Martin, 881 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, n.w.h.).
22. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 202.
23. Id.
24. Burns v. Resolution Rust Corp., 880 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.) (where RTC asked trial court to take judicial notice of Colorado law
and provided it with copies of Colorado statutes concerning mortgages, deeds of trust, and
foreclosure proceedings conducted by public trustee in Colorado, court of appeals pre-
sumed Colorado law was the same as Texas law on all other issues).
25. 863 S.W.2d 168, 174-75 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ request stayed).
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Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 203, which governs the determination of
laws of foreign countries, requires a party who intends to raise an issue
concerning the law of a foreign country to give notice in its pleadings or
other written notice at least thirty days prior to trial and to furnish oppos-
ing parties with written materials or sources he intends to use as proof of
the foreign law. In Lawrenson v. Global Marine, Inc.26 the Texarkana
court of appeals held that in a summary judgment proceeding, an affidavit
explaining the applicable laws of England was sufficient notice and proof
for a court to have taken judicial notice of English laws under Texas Rule
of Civil Evidence 203.27
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 204 governs the determination of city and
county ordinances, the contents of the Texas Register, and the rules of
agencies published in the Administrative Code.28 City charters have
been likened to municipal ordinances of which Texas courts have refused
to take judicial notice when not submitted in verified form, even though
Rule 204 has no verification requirement. 29
III. BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses presumptions.
Because the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence lack a corresponding Article
III, Texas common law continues to govern the law of presumptions.
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court discussed pre-
sumptions at length in General Motors Corp. v. Saenz.30 In Saenz, a
products liability action alleging failure to warn or inadequate warning,
the Texas Supreme Court held that a products liability plaintiff alleging
failure to warn or inadequate warning is entitled to a presumption that an
adequate warning would have been read and followed, but that such pre-
sumption is not conclusive and is subject to rebuttal by the defendant. 31
The supreme court explained that the effect of an evidentiary presump-
tion is to shift the burden of producing evidence to the party against
whom it operates, and that once that burden is discharged and evidence
contradicting the presumption has been offered, the presumption disap-
peared and was not to be weighed or treated as evidence. 32 The supreme
court held that a products liability plaintiff who ignored a manufacturer's
warning that would have prevented the injury is not entitled to a pre-
sumption that some additional warning would have been heeded.33
26. 869 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied).
27. Id at 525-26.
28. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 204.
29. Fields v. City of Texas City, 864 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, writ requested).
30. 873 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1993).
31. lId at 358-59.
32. Id at 359.
33. Id. at 359-61.
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Although reasonable inferences from evidence are permissible, 34 "a
possible cause only becomes 'probable' when in the absence of other rea-
sonable causal explanations it becomes more likely than not that the in-
jury was a result of its action. This is the outer limit of inference upon
which an issue can be submitted to the jury."35
The Texas Supreme Court discussed the operation of a shifting burden
of proof in County of Alameda, California v. Smith.36 Smith was a pater-
nity action in which the alleged father refused to submit to paternity test-
ing.3 7 The trial court concluded that the alleged father's failure to submit
to testing shifted to him the burden of proof on the issue of paternity,
which effectively created a presumption of fatherhood under section
13.06(d) of the Texas Family Code. In reversing and remanding the trial
court's holding that Smith was the child's biological and legal father and
awarding child support, the court of appeals held that the state bears the
burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient to support a default
judgment and placing on the alleged father the burden of persuasion on
the paternity issue. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the trial
court's holding that Smith was the child's biological and legal father and
awarding child support. The court of appeals held that although Smith's
refusal to submit to paternity testing shifted to him the burden of proving
that he is not the child's father, the state bears the burden of coming
forward with evidence sufficient to support a default judgment. In revers-
ing the judgment of the court of appeals and affirming the trial court's
judgment, the Texas Supreme Court held that an alleged father's refusal
to submit to paternity testing shifted to him the burden of proof on the
issue of paternity, effectively creating a presumption of fatherhood, and
in the absence of evidence from the alleged father, a mother's sworn pa-
ternity affidavit is sufficient to support a finding of paternity under sec-
tion 13.06(d) of the Texas Family Code.38
In Texas Tech University Health Center v. Apodaca3 9 the El Paso court
of appeals considered the burden of proof in a Batson4° violation. A
party who fails to meet its burden of proof loses.41 A prima facie case
34. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, No. 13-92-540-CV, 1994 WL 86436,
at *3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Mar. 17, 1994, n.w.h.).
35. Id. at 8-9 (citing Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 440 S.W.2d 43,
47 (Tex. 1969)) (expert testimony that radiation exposure "could have" caused plaintiff's
cancer was held to be "no evidence" of causation); Bradley v. Rogers, 879 S.W.2d 947, 954
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
36. 867 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1993).
37. Id. at 768.
38. ld at 769.
39. 876 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ requested).
40. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment is violated if prospective jurors are excluded from service in criminal trials on
the basis of race or ethnicity). This holding has been extended to civil cases. Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
41. Gulf State Util. Co. v. Coalition of Cities, 883 S.W.2d 739, 744 n.6 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1994, n.w.h.) (where party failed to meet its burden of proof on the prudence of
$1.453 billion claimed as cost of construction of nuclear power facility, the PUC effectively
disallowed that amount from the rate base).
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represents the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a ra-
tional inference that the allegation of fact is true, and the burden of es-
tablishing a prima facie case is on the movant.4 2 To establish a Batson
violation, it is no longer necessary that the complaining party's struck ve-
nire member be of the same race, but only that the venire member be of a
minority.4 3 A complaining party who establishes a prima facie case of a
Batson violation is entitled to an adversarial hearing to challenge the op-
posing counsel's possible discriminatory selection of the venire, but if the
complaining party fails to establish a prima facie case, the district court
can safely deny the complaining party's Batson objections." If an adver-
sarial hearing is held to challenge the opposing counsel's possible discrim-
inatory selection of the venire, the burden is on the opposing counsel to
articulate racially neutral reasons for the preemptory strikes at issue, and
once the opposing counsel has asserted its racially neutral explanation,
the burden of persuasion rests on the complaining party to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the invalidity of that explanation.45 A
Batson hearing is an evidentiary hearing held on the record in open court
with the district court serving as the fact finder.4 6 Because it is an adver-
sary proceeding with clearly identified burdens, the usual procedural and
evidentiary rules apply.4 7 In Apodaca civil defendants failed to establish
the required prima facie case showing that plaintiffs'preemptory strikes
were exercised in an effort to purposefully discriminate, where the de-
fendant specifically objected to striking of six unidentified venire mem-
bers because they were different ethnic persuasions than plaintiff but,
other than identifying the sole African-American on the venire, the de-
fendant wholly failed to establish the racial background of the remaining
venire members who were peremptorily challenged by the plaintiff.48
Where the movant failed to establish that any excluded venire person is a
member of a minority group, no inference could be drawn that such ve-
nire persons were excluded from the venire simply because of their race
or ethnic origin.49
During the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court also considered the
burden of persuasion in Ex parte Roosth.50 Roosth was a petition for writ
of habeas corpus by a father held in contempt for failure to pay child
42. Apodaca, 876 S.W.2d at 407 (in order to challenge possible discriminatory selec-
tion of a jury venire, the complaining party must make a prima facie showing that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group, that the opposing counsel has exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the venire members of a minority group, and these facts and
any other relevant circumstances raise inference that opposing counsel excluded venire
persons from the venire because of their race). Id at 407 (citing TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. art. 35.261).





48. Id. at 408.
49. Id at 408-09.
50. 881 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1994).
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support.51 In holding that inability to pay child support is an affirmative
defense to the offense of contempt that must be proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the Texas Supreme Court wrote that due process
requires that an alleged criminal contemnor not shoulder the burden of
persuasion to disprove an element of the offense of contempt.5 2
In Mentis v. Barnard the Texas Supreme Court held that a litigant who
seeks to deny an opponent the right to use a witness has the burden of
producing evidence to show that the designation of the witness was not
made "as soon as practical" 53 under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
166b(6)(b). Similarly, in other discovery disputes, the movant has the
burden of producing evidence supporting its claims.54 Two courts during
the Survey period considered the burden of persuasion. The party who
asserts that a statute is unconstitutional has the burden of persuasion. 55
Even though the burden of production shifts in employment discrimina-
tion cases, the burden of persuasion remains continuously on the plain-
tiff.56 In Humphreys v. Caldwel 57 the Texas Supreme Court held that a
movant cannot meet its burden of producing evidence supporting privi-
lege claims with legally insufficient affidavits.5 8 However, the work prod-
uct privilege that was evident from the fact of documents at issue was
supported by the trial court's in camera inspection alone.59
IV. ARTICLE IV - RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
The most significant relevance case decided during the Survey period
did not discuss any specific rule of civil evidence. In Transportation In-
surance Co. v. Moriel60 the Texas Supreme Court held that evidence of
the defendant's net worth, which is generally relevant only to the amount
51. Id.
52. Id. at 300-301.
53. Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1994); see also Sims, 885 S.W.2d at 454
(citing Mentis v. Barnard).
54. Kessell v. Bridewell, 872 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, orig. proceeding) (in
mandamus action challenging trial court's order to allow claimants against an insurer to
discover employees' performance evaluation records, employees did not establish that they
had such privacy interest in the records sought from the insurer as to compel
nondisclosure).
55. Scurlock Permian Corp. v. Brazos County, 869 S.W.2d 478,484 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (oil marketing company's action for declaratory judgment
that state law providing for permitting of overweight vehicles preempted the power of the
county to require separate county permit).
56. Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (once plaintiff has established prima facia case of employment
discrimination, burden of production shifts to employer to articulate legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for any allegedly unequal treatment; after this is established by em-
ployer, burden then shifts back to plaintiff to prove that employer's articulated reasons are
pretext for unlawful discrimination).
57. Humphreys v. Caldwell, 888 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1994).
58. Id. at 470 (affidavits that failed to unequivocally show that they are based on per-
sonal knowledge and that contained no representation that the facts disclosed therein were
true and correct were legally insufficient to support claims of privilege).
59. Id.
60. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
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of punitive damages, has a very real potential for prejudicing the jury's
determination of other disputed issues in a tort case, and therefore con-
cluded that a trial court presented with a timely motion should bifurcate
the determination of the amount of punitive damages from the remaining
issues.61
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." 62 Several courts during
the Survey period cited Rule 401 as a basis for admitting or excluding
evidence. In a paternity action, the defendant was not entitled to present
evidence of the mother's sexual activity with others outside of the ninety-
day period during which the child had been conceived because such evi-
dence was not relevant to any issue in the case.63 In a mandamus pro-
ceeding arising out of orders denying a patient's motion to compel
discovery in a medical malpractice case, the physician's mental health
records were held to be relevant to the patient's claim that the physician
was impaired by intoxicant abuse during the time he treated the patient.
64
In a partnership's suit against its general partner for breach of fiduciary
duty alleging payment of excessive management fees and expenses, a
memorandum executed by the general partner and the limited partners'
representative, which provided for payment of a management fee to the
general partner, was relevant and admissible where it was alleged that the
general partner acted under and relied upon the memorandum in pay-
ment of his management fee, and then paid himself in excess of the al-
lowed amounts.65 Hotel bills previously incurred by an alien hotel guest
and his family were relevant and admissible in a resident alien hotel em-
ployee's action against the guest for false imprisonment, gross negligence,
terroristic threat, assault, reckless conduct, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, because the bills helped to demonstrate the hotel's
motive for pressuring the employee after the incident so as to explain
some of the employee's actions after the incident.66 In a third party ac-
tion seeking contractual contribution from a corporation for its negli-
gence in connection with an underlying personal injury suit, excluded
expert testimony that the defendant's project violated certain OSHA reg-
61. Id. at 30 (not citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 401, 402, or 403).
62. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 401.
63. In re Martin, 881 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ) (citing
TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 401).
64. Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 401).
65. Murphy v. Seabarge, Ltd., 868 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1994, writ denied) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 401).
66. Haryanto v. Saeed, 860 S.W.2d 913, 924 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
writ denied) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 401).
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ulations was held to be plainly relevant to plaintiffs' negligence per se
theory under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 401.67
In a civil case seeking tort damages for sexual assault, evidence that the
defendant had assaulted another woman under similar circumstances
twenty-six months earlier was relevant to the material issue of defend-
ant's intent where the defendant admitted sexual intercourse but claimed
that intercourse was consensual. 68
In a negligence case against a hospital for injuries sustained by a pa-
tient when he fell while recuperating from a severe head injury, expert
testimony concerning a patient's future medical needs and expenses was
relevant and material because it was for the jury to determine future
medical expenses that were reasonable and necessary and were proxi-
mately caused by the hospital fall rather than a previous head injury.69
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 402 provides that all relevant evidence is
admissible except as otherwise provided by Constitution, statute, or rule,
and that irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 70 Because irrelevant evi-
dence is not admissible under Rule 402, an objection to the comments of
plaintiff's counsel's in a work related injuries case that the plaintiff/
worker was not covered by any workers compensation insurance should
have been sustained, although it was not the basis of reversible error ab-
sent a record demonstrating harm requiring reversal.
71
Because under Rule 402 all relevant evidence is admissible. except as
otherwise provided, before illegally obtained wiretap tapes can be held to
be inadmissible, the objecting party must show that their exclusion was
required under either federal or state statute. 72 Upon a showing that the
taped conversations were the subject of a criminal statute that criminal-
izes the dissemination of intercepted communications, and a civil statute
providing a method to prevent dissemination, the Court of Appeals for
the First District of Houston held that illegally obtained tapes were not
admissible and should not have been given to an expert witness for use in
forming her opinion on the issue of custody.
73
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 403 excludes relevant evidence on a vari-
ety of grounds. 74 During the Survey period, relevant evidence was ex-
cluded where it was cumulative. 75 While not mentioning the specific part
67. Lyondell Petrochemical Co. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
68. McLellan v. Benson, 877 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no
writ) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 401, 403, and 404(b)).
69. St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Graham, 883 S.W.2d 433, 438-39 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1994, writ requested) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 401 and 403).
70. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 402.
71. F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Love, 884 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1994, n.w.h.).
72. Collins v. Collins, No. 01-91-00782-CV, 1994 WL 416442, at *6-7 (Tex. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.], Aug. 11, 1994, n.w.h.).
73. Id. at *7.
74. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 403.
75. Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 883 S.W.2d 415, 428-29 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1994, writ requested) (affirming exclusion of bill of exception submitted by prospective
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of Rule 403 supporting the exclusion of evidence that would confuse the
issues or mislead the jury, one appellate court during the Survey period
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence
of a plaintiff's attempt to enforce restrictions on the use of property in
another similar case, where the admission would have required a trial
within a trial.76 Evidence of a defendant's alleged sexual assault on an-
other woman twenty-six months earlier was admissible in a civil tort suit
for sexual assault to show that the defendant intended to have sexual
intercourse with the plaintiff without her consent, notwithstanding the
prejudicial effect of the evidence on the defendant, where the jury was
instructed to consider the testimony only on the contested issue of intent
or consent, where the probative value of such extraneous prior miscon-
duct was particularly compelling, and where plaintiff had a compelling
need for the testimony. 77 During the Survey period, exclusion of evi-
dence under Rule 403 was held to be both harmful78 and harmless.79
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of other
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove character to show conduct in
conformity with the other wrongs or acts, but may be admissible for other
purposes.80 When evidence of an extraneous act or offense is offered, the
opponent must timely and properly object in order to preserve error.8' If
the proponent of misconduct evidence persuades the trial court that evi-
dence is relevant to a material issue, such as intent, the court may rule the
evidence admissible; if the opponent then makes timely further requests,
the trial judge should instruct the jury that the evidence is to be used only
for its relevant purpose.82 In McLellan v. Benson,8 3 a civil tort suit seek-
ing damages for sexual assault, evidence that the defendant had assaulted
purchasers alleged to have tortiously interfered with contractual relationship of cattle
seller to buyer, where the bill was cumulative and also involved an attempt to relitigate
issues that had been precluded by operation of res judicata); Parker v. Miller, 860 S.W.2d
452, 458 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (summary of prior assaultive con-
duct record of mentally retarded client at state school who beat and stomped another client
to unconsciousness was properly excluded from evidence in a personal injury suit where
summary was of records that were already in evidence and was therefore cumulative).
76. New Braunfels Factory Outlet Ctr., Inc. v. IHOP Realty Corp., 872 S.W.2d 303,
311-12 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
77. McLellan v. Benson, 877 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no
writ).
78. Sims, 885 S.W.2d at 450, 455 (excluded expert testimony had great probative value
and was not merely cumulative; "The test is not merely whether the evidence to be ad-
duced from the two witnesses is similar, but also whether the excluded testimony would
have added substantial weight to the offering party's case. If so, it is error to exclude.")
(citing Bohmfalk v. Linwood, 742 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (trial
court improperly excluded disinterested witness whose testimony corroborated testimony
of interested witness)).
79. In re Martin, 881 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ) (in a
paternity action, error, if any, in exclusion of letter written by mother to putative father
before the time when child could have been conceived was not reversible error because it
was not of the character that would cause the rendition of an improper verdict).
80. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 404(b).





another woman under similar circumstances twenty-six months earlier
was relevant to the material issue of defendant's intent, where the de-
fendant admitted sexual intercourse but claimed that intercourse was
consensual.84
Although Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 404(b) excludes evidence of
other wrongs or acts to prove conduct in conformity therewith, Texas
Rule of Civil Evidence 406 admits evidence of "habit" or routine prac-
tice. 85 In Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp.,86 a wrongful termination case, the
trial court's exclusion of evidence that the employer had terminated other
employees after they suffered on-the-job injuries and filed their compen-
sation claims was held to be error. The El Paso Court of Appeals found
the evidence to be a routine practice that should have been admitted
under Rule 406, and an exception to the doctrine of res inter alios acte
that admits prior acts or transactions with other persons to show a party's
intent or material, if they are so connected with the transaction at issue
that they may all be parts of a system, scheme, or plan. 87 Additionally,
the court of appeals found that the opening statement by employer's
counsel that "no one was ever fired as a result of a worker's comp claim,"
opened the door to the employee's evidence indicating a company policy
of dismissing employees filing workers compensation claims. 88
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 407 provides that although evidence of
subsequent remedial measures that would have made the event less likely
to occur is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in con-
nection with the event, Rule 407 does not require exclusion of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures when offered for another purpose.89
Even where evidence is admitted in violation of Rule 407, unless the im-
proper admission of evidence is shown to have caused rendition of an
improper judgment, the case will not be reversed.9°
Under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 408, offers to compromise dis-
puted claims are not admissible. 91 A trial court may exercise its discre-
tion in determining whether a communication amounts to a compromise
offer.92 The test as to whether a job offer by an employer whom a former
employee had sued for failing to rehire him after the employee had filed a
workers' compensation claim would amount to an offer of compromise so
84. Id at 457-58.
85. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 406.
86. 871 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
87. Id. at 268-69.
88. Id at 270.
89. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 407.
90. State v. McKinney, 886 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 28, 1994,
writ requested) (three items of evidence offered to show negligence in violation of Rule
407 did not require reversal).
91. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 408.
92. Tatum v. Progressive Polymers, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-'lIyler 1994, no
writ) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the job offer discussion was not




as to be inadmissible under Rule 408 was whether something was given
up by one or both of the parties to avoid the litigation. 93
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 408 does not require exclusion of com-
promise evidence when offered for a purpose other than proving liability
for or invalidity of a claim or its amount.94 Where no "other purposes"
could be found, one court of appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion
of letters containing settlement offers.95
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 411 provides that liability insurance is not
admissible on the issues of negligence or wrongful conduct. 96 TWo courts
during the Survey period held that the mere mention of insurance during
trial before the jury, even though erroneous, does not result in an auto-
matic mistrial or reversal. 97
V. ARTICLE V - PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs privileges. No
person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter 98 unless rules of
evidence recognize the privilege, 99 or a statute' °° or constitution' 01 grants
the privilege. Some of the specific privileges provided for in the Texas
Rules of Civil Evidence include: (1) lawyer-client privilege, 10 2 (2) hus-
band-wife communication privilege, 03 (3) communications to clergy-
men,10 4 (4) trade secrets, 05 and (5) physician-patient privilege. 10 6
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503 governs the attorney-client privilege.
Several courts during the Survey period considered issues relating to the
attorney-client privilege that arose during mandamus proceedings. In
-Pittsburgh Coming Corp. v. Caldwell,0 7a corporation's action seeking
93. ld.
94. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 408.
95. Barrett v. United States Brass Corp., 864 S.W.2d 606, 633 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1994, writ granted) (evidence of settlement letter offers made by manufacturer
of plumbing systems to buyers of homes in which systems were installed, offered to directly
defeat manufacturer's liability and amount of damages claimed in buyer's DTPA suit were
properly excluded from evidence).
96. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 411.
97. F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Love, 884 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1994, n.w.h.) (absent the complete statement of facts, appellate court could not review the
entire record to support appellant's argument of harmful error requiring reversal of the
judgment); Beall v. Ditmore, 867 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1994, writ denied)
(objection to testimony on existence of insurance did not require reversal where evidence
supported the findings on motorist's negligence in damages claims).
98. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 501(2).
99. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 502-510.
100. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 5561h, repealed by TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 509-10 as
to civil cases and TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 509-10 as to criminal cases (confidential communi-
cations between physician and patient relating to professional services rendered by a physi-
cian privilege).
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
102. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503.
103. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 504.
104. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 505.
105. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 507.
106. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 509.
107. 861 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
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mandamus relief from a district court's order requiring the corporation to
produce all or portions of documents allegedly protected by the attorney-
client privilege, the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Hous-
ton held that a memorandum concerning trial strategy that was authored
by the claims director for the corporation's insurance carrier that pro-
vided defense counsel for the corporation was protected from production
by the attorney-client privilege. Rejecting plaintiffs' claim that the docu-
ment did not fall within Rule 503 in light of the. Texas Supreme Court's
opinion in National Tank Co. v. Brotherton,10 8 the court of appeals distin-
guished the portion of Brotherton on which plaintiffs relied, explaining
that although the work product privilege under Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 166(b)(3) does not extend to all facts that an attorney may acquire,
the trial court did not have authority to shield portions of a document
from discovery by redaction of information covered by the attorney-client
privilege while allowing production of the remainder of the document. 10 9
The court held that once it is established that a document contains confi-
dential information, the attorney-client privilege extends to the entire
document, not merely to specific portions relating to legal advice, opin-
ions, or mental analyses." 0 In considering whether the attorney-client
privilege attached to documents produced as a result of a large meeting
guarding asbestos lawsuits held between the corporation's representatives
and its attorneys, the court of appeals held that the uncontroverted affi-
davit of the corporation's attorney was sufficient to establish the attor-
ney-client privilege."' Similarly, in Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye, 112 once
the movant made a.prima facie claim of privilege by pleading the privi-
lege, submitting affidavits from its attorneys and its privilege log, and en-
tering the documents for the trial court's in camera review, the burden
shifted to the opposing party to refute the privilege claim. In condition-
ally granting the writ of mandamus, the Dallas Court of Appeals ex-
plained that the subject matter of a completed attorney-client
communication is immaterial when deciding whether the privilege ap-
plies, and that the trial court's conclusion that the communications be-
tween Marathon and its attorneys concerned business activities was not
determinative." 3
Two courts during the Survey period held that the attorney-client privi-
lege did not apply to the documents at issue. The attorney-client privi-
lege did not apply to documents that related or referred to occasions
upon which a physician who was being sued for medical malpractice al-
legedly sought treatment for use of intoxicants." 4 Nor did the attorney-
108. 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
109. 861 S.W.2d at 426.
110. Id. at 425-26.
111. Id. at 424.
112. No. 05-94-00040-CV, 1994 WL 718445, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Aug. 16, 1994,
orig. proceeding).
113. Id. at 1994 WL 718445, at *4.




client privilege apply to questions to a party regarding her reasons for
apportioning a settlement fund." 5
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 505 contains the clergy-communicant
privilege. In Simpson v. Tennant," 6 a mandamus action arising out of a
suit by parents of a child injured in a church playground accident, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Houston considered an
issue of first impression in Texas - whether the clergy-communicant
privilege provided in Rule 505 protects the identify of the communicant.
In holding that the privilege prevented disclosure of the identity of a
communicant in the underlying tort suit, the court of appeals accepted
the clergyman's testimony that the unidentified communicant understood
that his identity would not be revealed." 7 The court of appeals explained
that confidentiality regarding a communicant's identity is critical to the
relationship between communicants and clergymen, that the relationship
between communicants and clergy is highly valued by society, and that
the benefit of preserving the clergy privilege outweighed the possible
benefit of disclosing the identity of the person who made the privileged
communication." 8
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 507 provides a qualified privilege for
trade secrets. In Humphreys v. Caldwell" 9 conclusory allegations in an
affidavit that information sought in a discovery request was proprietary in
nature and constituted trade secrets failed to support the claim of privi-
lege under Rule 507.120
Several cases during the Survey period considered both the physician/
patient privilege contained in Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 509, and the
mental health information privilege contained in Rule 510. In Groves v.
Gabriel,121 a personal injury action alleging inter alia, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the Texas Supreme Court held that although
the tort plaintiff alleging severe emotional damages including "post-trau-
matic stress disorder" waived any privilege as to medical records relevant
to her claim for emotional damages, medical records unrelated to plain-
tiff's emotional condition remained privileged and not subject to discov-
ery, citing both Rules 509(b)(2) and 510(b)(2). 122
In Gustafson v. Chambers23 neither the physician/patient privilege,
nor the mental health information privilege, protected from discovery in-
formation regarding occasions upon which the defendant physician in a
medical malpractice case sought treatment for abusive intoxicants.
115. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Wright, No. 01-93-00327-CV, 1994 WL 456789, at *9
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
116. 871 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding).
117. Id. at 305-06.
118. Id. at 306-10.
119. 881 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, orig. proceeding), overruled on
other grounds, Humphreys v. Caidwell, 888 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1994).
120. Id. at 946.
121. 874 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
122. Id. at 661.
123. 871 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding).
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A private meeting between a physician who had treated an injured
party and counsel for the store in which the injury took place was not
improper, where the injured party had waived the physician/patient privi-
leges to matters relevant to the lawsuit; the injured party had met with
the physician only once for medical care in connection with the injury
allegedly sustained as a result of the fall in the store; and, there was no
indication that the physician communicated any privileged information to
the store's counsel. 124
R.K. v. Ramirez 25 resolved a split that had developed in the courts of
appeals about the application of the patient-litigant exception to the phy-
sician/patient privilege and the mental health information privilege. 126
Two appellate courts held that the exception applied only when the ob-
jecting party attempted to make "offensive" use of the privilege, while
three other courts of appeals applied the language of the amended rule
literally. 127 In Ramirez the Texas Supreme Court held that the patient-
litigant exception is independent from and unrelated to the offensive use
doctrine articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. Fifth
Court of Appeals. 28 In Ramirez, a mandamus proceeding arising out of a
medical malpractice case, the Texas Supreme Court held that for a pa-
tient's condition to be part of a claim or defense, the condition itself must
be of legal consequence to a party's claim or defense, 129 namely that a
"jury determination that the condition exists [must be] of legal signifi-
cance to [a party's] claim or defense. 1 30 After the court of appeals ruled
that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the doctor's medical
records produced, absent any pleading placing the doctor's medical con-
dition in issue,' 3 ' plaintiffs amended their petition to allege that the doc-
tor's medical and emotional problems affected his ability to care for one
of the plaintiffs.' 32 The doctor reasserted Rule 509 and 510 privileges and
the trial court ordered his records produced. 133 The supreme court
agreed with the trial court that the pleadings were sufficient to show that
124. Hogue v. Kroger Store No. 107, 875 S.W.2d 477, 480-81 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 509(d)(4)).
125. 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994).
126. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 509(d)(4); TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 510(d)(5).
127. Compare K.P. v. Packer, 826 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceed-
ing) (in mental health record discovery request, nonoffensive use of privilege was upheld);
Dossey v. Salazar, 808 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceed-
ing) (in personal injury action, mental health condition not at issue); and Scheffey v. Cham-
bers, 790 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (in medical
malpractice case, nonoffensive use of privilege was upheld) with Gustafson v. Chambers,
871 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-Houston lst Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K. v. Ramirez,
855 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, orig. proceeding); and S.A.B. v.
Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding) (medical mal-
practice privilege upheld).
128. 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding).
129. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d at 840-41 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 509(d)(4) and 510(d)(5)).
130. Id. at 844.
131. Ramirez, 855 S.W.2d at 206.




plaintiffs were placing the doctor's medical condition at issue.'3 How-
ever, in holding that the trial court's production order was overly
broad, 135 the supreme court wrote that the trial court must ensure that
the patient's record be revealed "only to the extent necessary to provide
relevant evidence relating to the condition alleged" and that "trial courts
should use their authority to prevent the unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal, constitutional, or property rights."'1 36
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 511 governs waiver of privilege by volun-
tary disclosure. In Marathon Oil Co. v. Moy6137 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals considered whether a party impliedly waived its privilege by
producing other privileged documents in a previous lawsuit. Reasoning
that the claim of waiver was only a general statement alleging that docu-
ments previously produced covered a broad range of subject matters and
that the contested documents covered the same subject matter, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that such a general allegation of implied waiver of
privilege does not defeat a prima facie showing of privilege.
VI. ARTICLE VI - WITNESSES
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 603 requires that before testifying, every
witness be required to swear or affirm that he will testify truthfully. 138
Citing, inter alia, Rule 603, one court during the Survey period explained
that factual statements by an attorney during opening statement and jury
argument are not competent evidence that could support the jury's
finding.139
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 606, which governs competency of jurors
as witnesses, narrowly circumscribes proof of jury misconduct. 40 Upon
inquiry into the validity of a verdict, Rule 606(b) prohibits a juror from
testifying about any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations.' 4' In a wrongful termination case, statements by
the presiding juror as to the effect that workers compensation suits would
have on the employer would not support a claim of jury misconduct, even
if the juror's voir dire answers amounted to deliberate concealment.142
Although a juror's failure to disclose bias and prejudice can amount to
jury misconduct justifying a new trial, the complaining party must obtain
134. Id. at 840-43.
135. Id., at 844 (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 509(d)(e) and 510(d)(5)).
136. Id., at 843, 844.
137. No. 05-94-00040-CV, 1994 WL 718445 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Dec. 12, 1994, orig.
proceeding).
138. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 603.
139. Border Apparel-East, Inc. v. Guadian, 868 S.W.2d 894, 898 n.6 (Tex. App.-E
Paso 1993, no writ).
140. TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 606(b).
141. Id.




proof of a lie or concealment from some source other than the jury's
deliberations. 143
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 607 provides that the credibility of a wit-
ness may be attacked by any party. 4 In a personal injury and products
liability case alleging exposure to asbestos-containing products, the Dal-
las Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-
examination of an epidemiologist to exclude expert criticism of the epide-
miologist's earlier research, where the criticism was not relevant to the
epidemiologist's disposition to truthfully testify. 145
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 608(a) provides that subject to certain
limitations, the credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence in the
form of an opinion or reputation. 146 Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 608(b)
provides that specific instances of conduct of a witness, other than convic-
tion of a crime, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence for purposes of
attacking the credibility of the witness.' 47 In a summary judgment case, a
counter-affidavit that asserted that the affiants whose affidavits supported
a summary judgment had testified falsely in a related proceeding was held
not to be sufficient controverting evidence to create a fact issue preclud-
ing summary judgment. 148
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 609, which governs impeachment of a
witness by evidence of conviction of a crime, requires the trial court to
determine that the probative value of admitting the conviction outweighs
its prejudicial effect to a party. 149 In a case involving a dispute over the
ownership of funds on deposit in two bank accounts, a trial court's exclu-
sion of evidence concerning one of the possible recipients of the funds, in
order to discredit her credibility, was held not to be reversible error. 50
Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by excluding the evidence,
the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the error was
not reversible where the entire case did not turn upon the credibility of
the witness.' 51
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 611, which governs the mode and order of
interrogation and presentation of evidence, must be construed so that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined, as required
by Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 102.152 In considering the trial court's
conduct as background for appellant's complaints, the Corpus Christi
143. Id.
144. TEX. R. Cv. EVID. 607.
145. Keene Corp. v. Kirk, 870 S.W.2d 573, 580 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ) (also
holding that the manufacturer waived claim on appeal by failing to obtain adverse ruling
during the evidentiary portion of the trial).
146. TEX. R. Crv. EVID. 608(a).
147. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 608(b).
148. Closs v. Goose Creek Consol. Sch. Dist., 874 S.W.2d 859, 870 n.7 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1994, no writ).
149. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 609(a).
150. Oadra v. Stegall, 871 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
151. Id.
152. Sims v. Brackett, 885 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ)
(citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 102 and 611).
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Court of Appeals held that the trial court's refusal to permit re-cross and
re-direct examination to speed the trial, magnified the harmful effect of
excluding the testimony of one of appellant's experts.' 5 3
VII. ARTICLE VII - OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. QUALIFICATIONS OF EXPERTS
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702, which governs testimony by experts,
requires an expert to be qualified by scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge.' 54 Several courts during the Survey period considered
the qualifications of experts. In James v. Hudgins155 the El Paso Court of
Appeals held that a party did not establish that its proffered expert was
an expert in the issues asserted, where it failed to ask the witness any
questions about his qualifications or experience with regard to those is-
sues, and no deposition testimony regarding his expertise was solicited by
either party.' 56 The court explained that the party offering expert opin-
ion has the burden of establishing that the expert is qualified, namely,
that the expert possesses a higher degree of knowledge than an ordinary
person or the trier of fact, and that this burden can only be met by show-
ing that the expert is trained in the science of which he or she testifies, or
has knowledge of the subject of the fact in question. 157
Other courts during the Survey period found experts to be qualified.
One trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that an attor-
ney was qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of the standard of
care for a reasonably prudent insurer. The insurer assumed the duty to
represent the insured, and its attorney testified that he had worked as
outside counsel for insurance firms defending insureds as well as his expe-
rience as a personal injury lawyer and as educational and experiential
background in the context of insurance-related lawsuits.' 5 8 Another
court held that a rehabilitation counselor and rehabilitation specialist was
qualified to express an opinion as to a life-care plan for a plaintiff who
sustained injuries when he fell at a hospital while recuperating from a
severe head injury. 1-59
While the Rules of Criminal Evidence require a party against whom
expert opinion is being offered be given an opportunity to conduct voir
dire examination, the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence have no such
provision.' 60
153. Id.
154. TEx. R. Civ. EvrD. 702.
155. 876 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
156. Id. at 422.
157. Id. at 421.
158. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 880 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1994, writ granted).
159. St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Graham, 883 S.W.2d 433,439 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994,
writ requested).
160. Brook v. Brook, 865 S.W.2d 166, 172 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993), aff'd, 881
S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1994).
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B. MEDICAL CAUSATION/BASES OF EXPERT OPINION
The leading case decided during the Survey period regarding medical
causation and the bases for expert opinion is Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Havner.161 Havner was a products liability case seeking dam-
ages for birth defects caused by Bendectin, a morning sickness drug
manufactured by appellant. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found
that in such cases causation must be proved, if at all, by scientific expert
testimony as to the reasonable probability of the causal link alleged.162
To constitute proof, the expert testimony must establish the "reasonable
probability" of a causal connection.163 Proof of mere possibilities will not
support the submission of an issue to a jury.164 The court noted that
while reasonable inferences from evidence are permissible, a possible
cause only becomes probable when in the absence of other reasonable
causal explanations it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a
result of its action. 165 The Corpus Christi court held that even when an
expert expresses his opinion using the magic words, "reasonable
probability," the entire substance of the expert's testimony must be ex-
amined to determine whether the opinion is based on demonstrable facts
and not solely on assumptions, possibility, speculation, and surmise. 166
The Corpus Christi court also held that when the phrase "reasonable
medical probability" is used, it will amount to some evidence only when it
represents the overall substance of the expert's opinion and is based on
more than purely speculative conclusions or personal opinion on un-
grounded scientific reality. "Reasonable probability cannot be created by
the mere utterance of magic words by someone designated [as] an ex-
pert."'1 67 Assuming arguendo that the Havners' experts were correct that
all the animal studies and all the human epidemiologic studies on which
Merrell Dow relied were wrong, the Corpus Christi court explained that
the most it could conclude was that Merrell Dow had no conclusive evi-
dence showing Bendectin never causes birth defects in humans.168 The
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals explained further that absence of evi-
dence of a fact, standing alone, does not amount to some evidence of its
converse. 169 The Corpus Christi court further held that despite the use of
magic words by the Havners' experts, there was no evidence of the causal
link between Bendectin and the alleged birth defects.' 70 The court re-
161. No. 13-92-540-CV, 1994 WL 86436 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Mar. 17, 1994,
n.w.h.) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 702, 703, and 705).
162. Id. at *3.
163. Id. at *34.
164. Id. at *3 (citing Duff v. Yellin, 751 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1988)).
165. Id. at *3 (citing Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 440 S.W.2d 43,47(Tex. 1969)) (expert testimony that radiation exposure "could have" caused plaintiff's can-
cer was held to be no evidence of causation)).
166. Havner, 1994 WL 86435, at *3.
167. Id. at *3.
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id.
170. Id at "10.
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jected the Havners' argument that this case presented a classic battle of
experts which meant it should defer to the jury's determination as it did
in American Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson.171 The court distinguished
American Cyanamid, another product liability action, because there was
underlying, scientifically based opinion testimony on both sides of the
controversy, whereas in this case, all the primary researchers who have
studied Bendectin have reached one conclusion, which did not support
the theory postulated by the Havners' experts. 172
During the Survey period one court citing Havner held in a medical
malpractice case that reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are
permissible. 173 In another medical malpractice case that preceded Hav-
ner, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that expert testimony was not
sufficient to show a causal connection between nurses' alleged negligence
in monitoring a mother's condition and an injury suffered by her daughter
at birth. An expert stated that warning signs "hopefully" would have
been picked up early and the nurses' failure to see the warning signs
"probably" caused the obstetrician to deliver the daughter vaginally and
not by caesarian section. The court held the expert's testimony was
"based upon mere speculation and conjecture.' ' 174
Whether there is a reasonable probability that a patient's injuries were
caused by a doctor's negligence is determined by consideration of the
substance of the expert's testimony, "does not turn on semantics or use
by the witness of any term or phrase.' 75 A medical expert's testimony in
the abstract about mortality was not evidence of proximate cause in a
medical malpractice action against a physician where the expert did not
state that the patient would have lived longer if surgery had been per-
formed earlier. 76 Similarly, a medical expert's testimony that more of
the patient's skin and subcutaneous tissue may have survived had surgery
been performed earlier was only evidence of mere possibility and did not
establish proximate cause in the medical malpractice case against the
physician for failure to diagnose properly. 177
The facts or data upon which expert opinion is based need not be ad-
missible into evidence if of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field to form an opinion or inferences upon the subject.' 78
"An expert witness can testify from a published hearsay article as one of
the bases for his or her expert opinion."'1 79 Although "opinions based
171. 732 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. Havner, 1994 WL 86436, at *10.
173. Bradley, 879 S.W.2d at 954.
174. Lopez v. Central Plains Regional Hosp., 859 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1993, no writ).
175. Bradley v. Rogers, 879 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
writ requested).
176. Id at 957-58.
177. Id. at 959-60.
178. TEX. R. Crv. EVID. 703.
179. New Braunfels Factory Outlet Ctr., Inc. v. IHOP Realty Corp., 872 S.W.2d 303,
310 n.5 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 703).
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entirely on inadmissible facts or data may be admitted if ... of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field," hearsay facts or data on
which the expert relies must be reliable in and of themselves. 180 The ex-
pert testimony of an actuary and of an actuarial study was held properly
excludable where it was so infected by untrustworthy data that it would
not prove helpful to the factfinder.' 8 '
C. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
In Crum & Forster, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 82 appellants complained of
the trial court's ruling to allow an expert witness to testify regarding the
propriety of Mary Carter agreements. At the time of testimony Mary
Carters were against the public policy of the State of Texas as pronounced
by the Texas Supreme Court. 8 3 The witness' testimony involved a mixed
question of law and fact, as permitted by Birchfield v. Texarkana Memo-
rial Hospital.'84 The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that most of the
witness' testimony pertained to the facts of the case, and that to the ex-
tent that the legal principles involving a Mary Carter Agreement were
applied to the facts of the case, they constituted a mixed question of law
and fact. 185 The court also held that the witness' testimony was not objec-
tionable just because it was sprinkled with legal ramifications, such as
explaining the term "subrogation" to the jury.186 The Texarkana court
stated that because this was a case about litigation, it would be impossible
to discuss the .case without bringing in legal principles. 187
In another case, expert testimony was admissible by a former Texas
Supreme Court justice stating procedures required by law to protect a
child were not followed during settlement procedures with a fifteen year
old survivor of an automobile accident.' 88 Finding that the testimony
would have assisted the trier of fact to understand the evidence, the court
permitted the to testify that the insurance company had a duty to deal
with the child fairly, honestly and in good faith. Once the choice was
made by the carrier to deal with the child, a fiduciary relationship
existed.' 89
180. Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61, 105 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1993, writ granted).
181. Id (quoting the study itself as stating that information available was far from per-
fect and that preparers had to rely on non-Texas data, outdated information, noninsurance
data, and that it was not possible to predict near-term effects of 1989 Workers' Compensa-
tion Act precisely, and that statistical significance could not be attributed to calculations of
State Board of Insurance benefits).
182. 887 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ requested).
183. Id. at 132-33.
184. 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987).
185. Crum & Forster, 887 S.W.2d at 135.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 861 S.W.2d 926, 937-39 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1994, writ granted).
189. Id. at 938.
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VIII. ARTICLE VIII - HEARSAY
A. IDENTIFYING HEARSAY
Whether a record or statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
constitutes hearsay is often difficult to determine. 19 Specifically,
"[h]earsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted."'191 Exceptions to this general rule are set forth in
Rules 803 through 806.192
During the Survey period, several Texas appellate courts considered
whether proffered evidence was hearsay. Where an out-of-court state-
ment was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to
show that it was made, the statement was not hearsay. 193 In a personal
injury action, the deposition of a government official was inadmissible
hearsay as to an engineering firm when the deposition was taken in an-
other lawsuit where the engineering firm was not a party. 194 In a medical
malpractice case where a physician's statement was hearsay and not ad-
mitted for the truth of the matter asserted but to show the emotional
impact the statement made, the statement to the patient's husband was
not probative of causation. 195
Additionally, contracts admitted under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule were deemed admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted. 196 The court rejected the appellant's contention that the
records were admitted only as business records.197 On the other hand,
failure to authenticate a document renders it inadmissible hearsay, even if
the document is otherwise relevant and admissible. 198
B. PROBATIVE VALUE OF HEARSAY ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJEcTION
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 802 provides that "[i]nadmissible hearsay
admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely
because it is hearsay."'199 During the Survey period, the San Antonio
190. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 801-806 comprehensively define the hearsay rule and its excep-
tions. Additionally, "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." TEX. R. Civ.
EVID, 602.
191. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by law." TEX. R. Civ. EVID.
802.
192. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 803-806.
193. Closs, 874 S.W.2d at 870 n.6. (citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 801(d)).
194. Romero v. Parkhill, Smith & Cooper, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1994, no writ) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 801).
195. Bradley, 879 S.W.2d at 957.
196. Overall v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, 869 S.W.2d 629, 632-33 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
197. Id.
198. Durkay v. Madco Oil Co., 862 S.W.2d 14, 23-24 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994,
writ denied) (excluded report arguably admissible under TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 801(e)(2)(B)
where it was not authenticated).
199. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 802.
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Court of Appeals held that absent any hearsay objection, an affidavit op-
posing summary judgment had probative value even though it contained
inadmissible hearsay.200 Similarly, where no hearsay objection was made,
the Austin Court of Appeals admitted hearsay evidence because it sup-
ported an important finding by the Board of Medical Examiners. The
Board found a physician violated the Medical Practice Act by aiding or
abetting the practice of medicine by an unlicensed corporation as well as
another section of the Act by signing bills or health insurance claims
forms without providing any direct or' indirect patient treatment, causing
the revocation of his license.201
Although hearsay evidence admitted without objection has probative
value, when hearsay is admitted over appropriate objection, it has no pro-
bative value. It should not be considered in evaluating sufficiency of the
evidence, 202 or to prove causation.203
C. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT AND
MATERIAL
1. Then Existing Mental, Emotional or Physical Condition
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(3) admits into evidence statements of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition. 204 Under Rule 803(3), the testimony of a consulting profes-
sional engineer, who was also the president of an oil and gas company,
was admissible against another oil company. The expert's statement re-
garding the company's willingness to buy oil and gas leases, including its
offer of a bonus to the lessee, was admitted to show the amount of the
contemplated bonus allegedly lost as a result of the lessee's failure to
release his interest.205
2. Business Records
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(6) governs the introduction of
records of regularly conducted activities, commonly known as business
records.206 Rule 803(6) requires that the records be kept "in the course
of a regularly conducted business activity" by a person with knowledge of
the recorded information and as a regular practice of the business. 20 7 A
defendant's objection that an exhibit did not comply with Rule 803(6)
was sufficient to raise a hearsay objection, and where the custodian did
200. Casas v. Gilliam, 869 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ).
201. Guerrero-Ramirez v. Texas Bd. of Medical Examiners, 867 S.W.2d 911, 921 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
202. Atkinson Gas Co. v. Albrecht, 878 S.W.2d 236,242-43 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1994, writ denied) (finding hearsay objection preserved error but that evidence objected to
was admissible under TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 803(3)).
203. Bradley, 879 S.W.2d at 957.
204. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 803(3).
205. Atkinson, 878 S.W.2d at 243.




not verify that the information contained in the record complied with the
requirements of Rule 803(6), the records were hearsay. 20 8 Where con-
tracts were admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay
rule, they were admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.20 9
3. Market Reports, Commercial Publications
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(17) admits into evidence, as excep-
tions to the hearsay rule, "[m]arket quotations, tabulations, lists, directo-
ries, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by
the public or by persons in particular occupations. '210 For example, Con-
sumer Reports article of the "Best Meals Best Deals" was erroneously
admitted under Rule 803(17). However, it did not require a reversal be-
cause several articles of the same nature had already been admitted with-
out objection during the testimony of an expert witness. Further, another
expert witness testified to essentially the same facts as those contained in
the article.211
4. Judgment of Previous Conviction
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(22) admits into evidence, as excep-
tions to the hearsay rule "[elvidence of a judgment, entered after a trial
or upon a plea of guilty ... adjudging a person guilty of a felony, to prove
any fact essential to sustain the judgment of conviction. '212 In an attor-
ney and accountant malpractice case, a plaintiff's criminal conviction was
admissible, collaterally estopping the plaintiff from asserting that he re-
lied on the advice of the defendants, because such reliance would have
been a defense in the criminal proceeding. 213
5. Statements Against Interest
A statement that is so contrary to the declarant's interest at the time it
is made "that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true" is admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(24).214 If a
statement is not against interest at the time it is made, it is not admissible
as a statement against interest.215 Further, a statement against interest is
208. Sholdra v. Bluebonnet Say. Bank, FSB, 858 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1994, writ denied).
209. Overall, 869 S.W.2d at 633.
210. TEX. R. Civ. Evio. 803(17).
211. New Braunfels Factory Outlet Ctr., Inc. v. IHOP Realty Corp., 872 S.W.2d 303,
310 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
212. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 803(22).
213. Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 859 S.W.2d 441, 449-50 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
214. TEX. R. Ov. EVID. 803(24).
215. Cartwright v. MBank Corpus Christi, 865 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding declaration by assignor made after assigning full inter-
est in promissory note was not admissible against assignee).
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not admissible where it is offered against someone other than the
declarant.216
D. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 804 narrowly circumscribes three hearsay
exceptions based on the unavailability of the declarant.217 Under certain
circumstances, declarant unavailability allows the admission of testimony
given by a witness at another hearing on the same matter, at a different
procedure, or in a deposition taken in the course of another proceed-
ing.2 18 Unavailability is defined in Texas Rule of Civil Evidence
804(a).219 Unavailability did not exist simply because counsel stated that
an expert did not appear in past trials due to ill health. The expert's pres-
ence at the current trial was necessary in order to admit a videotaped
deposition taken in connection with unrelated litigation.220
IX. ARTICLE IX - AUTHENTICATION AND
IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 901(a) requires authentication or identifi-
cation of evidence as a condition precedent to its admission.221 The au-
thentication requirement "is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. '222 In an
action to reform an assignment of interest in a right to produce oil, gas,
and other hydrocarbons, a corporate officer's admission on cross-exami-
nation, classifying a letter an "internal document" of the corporation was
"sufficient to support its admission. '223 In a hearing to determine
whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult on murder charges, the
juvenile's confession was admitted after proper authentication. The ar-
resting officer testified that the confession was a true and correct copy of
the statement given by the juvenile, as well as identifying the juvenile in
the courtroom.2 24 An unsigned report discussing a perceived connection
between exposure to asbestos and certain forms of cancer could not be
216. State and Dallas v. Heal, 884 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ re-
quested) (holding notice of appraised value of property prepared by the Dallas Central
Appraisal District not admissible against the City of Dallas where no affirmative act of the
City was required to institute the district's appraisal).
217. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 804.
218. TEX. R. Civ. EViD. 804(b)(1).
219. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 804(a).
220. Keene, 863 S.W.2d at 178-79.
221. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 901(a).
222. Id.
223. E.P. Operating Co. v. Sonora Exploration Corp., 862 S.W.2d 149, 153-154 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (citing TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 901(a) and
901(b)).
224. In re G.F.O., 874 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ)
(citing TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 901(a)).
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authenticated by its author's videotape deposition, where the deposition
itself was inadmissible hearsay. 225
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 902 permits self-authentication of docu-
ments under certain circumstances. 226 A document that is not self-au-
thenticating and is not authenticated in some other manner, is
inadmissible, even if it might have been admissible had it been authenti-
cated.227 Copies of an application for an order accepting the closing of
bankruptcy proceedings were self-authenticated where they were certi-
fied by the bankruptcy court. Therefore, the copies were competent sum-
mary judgment evidence. 228  The affidavit of a school district
superintendent satisfied the requirement of personal knowledge, even
though no specific recitation was made. The affidavit was submitted in
support of the school district's motion for summary judgment. It estab-
lished the superintendent as the district's custodian of records allowing
the authentication of various school records as true and correct copies of
original documents.229
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 902(6) permits self-authentication of do-
mestic public documents not under seal.230 An authentication certificate
of a foreign judgment was upheld even though the judge failed to fill in
the blank identifying the clerk of the court.231 The certificate purported
to bear the signature of a court clerk and certification by a judge of its
accuracy.
X. ARTICLE X - CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS,
AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X of the Texas Rule of Civil Evidence governs the admission of
the contents of writings, recordings, and photographs.232 Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 1001 defines the items "original" and "duplicate. '233 A
duplicate is a counterpart produced by the same process that produced
the original, or by other processes that accurately reproduce the origi-
nal.234 Although after a proper predicate is laid, the trial court can in its
discretion admit audiotape recordings into evidence, a transcript made
from an audiotape recording is neither an "original" as defined by Rule
225. Keene Corp. v. Rogers, 863 S.W.2d 168, 178-79 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ
requested stayed) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 901(b)(1)).
226. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902.
227. Durkay v. Madco Oil Co., 862 S.W.2d 14, 23-24 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993,
writ denied) (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902).
228. Shaw v. Kennedy, Ltd., 879 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ)
(citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902).
229. Closs, 874 S.W.2d at 868.
230. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902(6).
231. Tri-Steel Structures, Inc. v. Hackman, 883 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1994, writ requested) (citing TEX. R. Civ. Evio. 902(2)).
232. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 1001-1008.
233. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 1001(3) and 1001(4).
234. TEX. R. Crv.'EVID. 1001(4).
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1001(3), nor a "duplicate" as defined by Rule 1001(4).235 As such, writ-
ten transcripts of portions of audiotapes were inadmissible after the audi-
otapes themselves were admitted. 236 However, the error was found
harmless after the special master listened to each admitted audiotape in
its entirety, paying special attention to context and audibility.
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 1003 provides that a duplicate is admissi-
ble to the same extent as an original unless there is a question over the
authenticity of the original or the fairness of admitting the duplicate in
lieu of the original. 237 Where a party neither attacked the authenticity of
the original documents nor claimed it would be unfair to admit dupli-
cates, one appellate court during the Survey period rejected a party's ar-
gument regarding inadmissible copies where the absence of the originals
had not been explained. 238
XI. PAROL EVIDENCE
Several courts during the Survey period excluded parol evidence to in-
terpret an unambiguous written contract. 239 A defendant's affidavit at-
tached to his response to a motion for summary judgment constituted
impermissible parol evidence. The affidavit stated that the parties who
drafted a promissory note intended that the affiant be personally liable
only through his guaranty. 240 Where no ambiguity in a contract exists,
but the parties disagree about the interpretation of the contract, parol
evidence cannot be used to create an ambiguity.241 An expressed or im-
plied covenant not to obstruct a property owner's view could not be es-
tablished by parol evidence because it would create a negative easement.
235. In re Thoma, 873 S.W.2d 477, 487 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994) (judicial disciplinary
proceeding).
236. Id. at 488.
237. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 1003.
238. Closs, 874 S.W.2d at 868.
239. Romero, 881 S.W.2d at 526-27 (holding parol evidence not admissible to place
duty on engineering firm or to enlarge its responsibilities in contradiction of clear terms of
contract to provide engineering services for construction of sewage treatment plant where
contract was not ambiguous); Robbins v. HNG Oil Co., 878 S.W.2d 351, 355 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (regarding an unambiguous deed); Louisiana Natural
Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding parol evidence excluded absent pleading or
argument that arbitration agreement at issue was ambiguous); Banks v. Browning, 873
S.W.2d 763, 764-65 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied) (holding unambiguous ac-
count cards creating joint account with right of survivorship on file at banks); LA&N Inter-
ests, Inc. v. Fish, 864 S.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ)(holding parol evidence inadmissible to supply essential elements of brokerage
agreement).
240. Fimberg v. FDIC, 880 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ requested)
(holding parol evidence inadmissible to interpret a promissory note).
241. Markert v. Williams, 874 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,
writ denied) (unambiguous commercial lease containing both an option to purchase at
fixed price and right of first refusal).
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Such an agreement could not be performed within one year, making it
subject to the statute of frauds242 which requires written agreement. 243
Several courts during the Survey period admitted parol evidence in or-
der to interpret ambiguous contracts. 2" The meaning of an ambiguous
contract presents a question of fact for the jury to decide. Where parol
evidence was admitted to interpret an ambiguous contract, a trial court
erred by not submitting jury questions on the meaning of the ambiguous
contract. 245 The parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic proof of mu-
tual mistake for purposes of seeking recision of a contract. 246 In an unin-
sured motorist case, the defendant insurer refused to pay claiming that
the plaintiff never obtained its written permission to sue the uninsured
motorist. The trial court erred by construing the letter as part of the in-
surance contract and excluding it from evidence.247
The existence and terms of a written contract for the sale of an interest
in real property may be proved by parol evidence if the written and
signed memorandum is lost or destroyed. If the parties seeking to prove
the agreement are unable to produce the written memorandum in court,
proof of the memorandum and its terms must be clear and convincing. 248
One court found a party's proof of a signed agreement insufficient to sup-
ply the terms of the lost agreement. 249
242. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
243. Ramsey v. Lewis, 874 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ).
244. 626 Joint Venture v. Spinks, 873 S.W.2d 73, 75-76 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no
writ) (references in note and other sale documents to individual as "Trustee" were ambigu-
ous and thus parol evidence did not bar introduction of evidence showing that individual
was acting as representative of joint venture with respect to purchase of real property
where references to "Trustee" showed that note was signed by individual in representative
capacity, but did not show for whom he was acting); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 319
(Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ) (where contingent attorney fee contract was ambiguous
because document referred to "my" claim that those claims were based on child's injury
even though original petition named child's mother individually and as child's next friend,
and written provision of contract provided for waiver of attorney's fees if recovery was
simply "limits of liability" but did not define that term, contingent fee contract was unclear
as to whose claims were covered, and thus court properly admitted parol evidence to clar-
ify meaning of ambiguous terms); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Jaeger, 867 S.W.2d 824, 828-30
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ requested) (written employment contract applicable to
ramp, provisioning, and operations agents of airline was ambiguous as to whether opera-
tions supervisor was covered by agreement, and thus supervisor's testimony was admissible
parol evidence to determine subjective intent of the parties at the time of contract
formation).
245. City of Beaumont v. Excavators & Constructors, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 123, 146 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1993, writ requested).
246. De Monet v. Pera, 877 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
247. Azima v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 884 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1994, n.w.h.).
248. Chakur v. Zena, 233 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, no writ).
249. E.P. Operating Co. v. MJC Energy Co., 883 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1994, writ requested).
19951

